Harmonising Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act through International Accounting Standards – Reasons why International Accounting Standards Should Serve as “Thermostats by Ojo, Mariane.B.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990529
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Why  should  differences  between  regulatory  and  accounting  policies  be  mitigated?  
Because mitigating such  differences could facilitate convergence – as well as financial 
stability. 
 
 
The paper ―Fair Value Accounting and Procyclicality: Mitigating Regulatory and 
Accounting Policy Differences through Regulatory Structure Reforms and Enforced Self 
Regulation‖ illustrates how the implementation of accounting standards and  policies, in  
certain  instances,  have  contrasted  with  Basel  Committee  initiatives  aimed  at 
mitigating procyclicality and facilitating forward looking provisioning. The paper also 
highlights how and why differences between regulatory and accounting policies could 
(and should) be mitigated. 
 
This paper focuses on how recent regulatory reforms – with particular reference to the 
Dodd Frank Act, impact fair value measurements. Other potential implications for 
accounting measurements and valuation, will also be considered. Given the tendencies 
for discrepancies to arise between regulatory and accounting policies, and owing to 
discrepancies between Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act, would a more imposing and 
commanding role for international standards not serve as a powerful weapon in 
harmonizing Basel III and Dodd Frank – whilst mitigating regulatory and accounting 
policy differences? 
 
 
Key Words: financial stability, OTC derivatives markets, counterparty risks, disclosure, 
information asymmetry, transparency, living wills, Volcker Rule, Basel III, Basel II, pro 
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A. Introduction 
 
Whilst several conflicts persist between Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act, amongst 
which include the fact that: 
 
- the Dodd Frank Act not only prohibits US regulators from relying on external 
credit ratings in any regulation – thus „making the implementation of Basel 
reforms relating to securitization and resecuritizations impossible,
2
  
- it places US banks at a possible „competitive disadvantage under Basel III,‖3 as 
well as; imposes additional cost burdens and problematic implementation issues 
(in matters relating to consistency, comparability and reliability of risk weighting 
measurements) for foreign financial firms; 
 
Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act share many commonalities. 
  
Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act are both macro prudential regulatory measures 
aimed at improving financial stability. 
 
 
Recent measures aimed at fostering financial stability have focussed on macro 
prudential measures as  well  as  measures  aimed  at  mitigating  pro  cyclicality.  The  
Basel  Committee  on  Banking Supervision has been engaged in several initiatives, in 
collaboration with its introduction of Basel III, which are aimed at mitigating 
procyclicality. Such initiatives include:
4
 
 
- the assessment and dampening of the cyclicality of minimum capital 
requirements; 
- the facilitation of forward-looking provisioning; 
                                                 
1
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the loving and enduring memory of my beloved mum, Mrs Florence Ojo (University of Heidelberg, 
Schiller College 1978 -1980). 
2
 See H Scott, „Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation― Journal of 
International Economic Law 13(3) at pages 766-767. 
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 See Speech by Stefan Walter, Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the 
Risk Europe Pre Conference Summit, Brussels 4 April 2011. 
4
 R Moreno, „Policymaking from a Macro prudential Perspective― BIS Working Paper No 336, January 
2011 at page 13 of 24 
- the adoption of a regulatory framework for capital conservation and 
countercyclical buffers; 
- the introduction of a minimum leverage ratio. 
 
 
Disclosure   and   transparency   constitute   fundamental   elements   which   foster   
accountability. Transparency  is  considered  to  be  „a  beneficial  element  in  agency  
relationships  because  more information  about  the  agent  makes  the  agent  more  
accountable  to  the  principal.‖5  However circumstances whereby „committing to the 
concealment of certain kind of information― could prove beneficial to the principal, 
have also been identified.
6
 
 
 
 
The Dodd Frank Act
7
 is an Act whose aims include the promotion of the financial 
stability of the United States through improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, the ending of the concept of ‗‗too big to fail‘‘, the protection of 
American taxpayers though the ending of bailouts, and the protection of consumers from 
abusive financial services practices.
8
 
 
Title One of the Act, also known as the ―Financial Stability Act of 2010‖9 (and 
particularly subtitle A under this Title), is dedicated exclusively towards consideration of 
measures which have been (and are being) instigated to promote financial stability. Under 
subtitle A, the establishment of a ―Financial Stability Oversight Council‖ is highlighted -  
whose purposes include:
10
  
 
- the identification of risks to the financial stability of the United States that could 
arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, 
interconnected bank holding companies or non bank financial companies, or that 
could arise outside the financial services marketplace; 
- the promotion of market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part of 
shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such companies that the 
Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and 
- responding to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial 
system. 
 
                                                 
5
 A Prat, „The Wrong Kind of Transparency― LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE439 October 2002 at 
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 ―Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act‘‘. See 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf at page 1 
8
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 See section 101 of the Act 
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 See section 112; For duties of the Council, also refer to subsection a (2) of section 112. Amongst its 
duties, a significant one being ―the annual reporting of  financial market and regulatory 
developments, including insurance and accounting regulations and standards, along with an assessment 
of those developments on the stability of the financial system.‖ 
 
  
 
 
B. To What Extent do Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act Respectively Facilitate 
Greater Transparency and Disclosure? 
 
Financial stability functions and objectives, it is argued,
11
 are often considered to be 
less defined and more ambiguous than monetary policy objectives.  Hence financial 
stability functions and objectives could be  considered  to be in greater need of more 
defined, clearer, and more explicit mandates.  Reasons attributed to the need for 
explicit mandates with explicit objectives in order to facilitate effective execution of 
the financial stability function are as follows:
12
 
 
- It helps those in the private sector that are subject to policy to be able to 
predict the likely direction of official actions under different scenarios 
- Policy actions to constrain risk taking activities which threaten financial stability 
 
However, even though advantages exist in stipulating clear mandates, certain 
disadvantages also emanate from the stipulation of mandates in a ―clear and explicit‖ 
way which does not provide for flexibility in relation to an area such as financial 
stability – an area which, to a large extent, involves contingency issues13 and 
uncertainty. 
 
In his paper, ―Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III is doomed‖,14 Ranjit Lall 
highlights various deficiencies attributed to Basle II. He highlights the Basel Committee‘s 
                                                 
11
 ―Maintain financial stability is less easily interpreted than maintain price stability since price stability can 
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  ―Given the current state of knowledge about what constitutes financial stability, and its main 
drivers, attempting to direct policy actions by way of explicit objectives, may create practical 
difficulties. Three reasons being: 
- It would be unfortunate if explicit objectives excluded policy options which turn out to 
be favorable 
-  A clear objective statement directing the policy to ensure financial stability, 
without indicating the limits to which the authorities are prepared to insure private 
agents against tail risk events, may induce greater risk taking than available policy 
instruments are able to cope with. 
- The unpredictability of financial crises 
 
For these reasons, it is important to have flexible legislation which is adaptable to potential changes‖ 
see ibid at page 30 
14
 Basel II‘s failure, in Lall‘s opinion can be summed up as a result of ―regulatory capture‖. ―A small group 
of international banks were able to take control of the Basel process, transforming the rules of international 
failure to achieve its first and second aims for the Accord - the result of its decision to 
allow wealthy banks to use internal ratings. He also refers to the Basel Accord‘s third 
aim, and the related developments in the treatment of market risk, the trading book, and 
securitization that caused Basel II to fall short of providing a more ‗comprehensive‘ 
approach to risk management. The ―very real social cost‖ of Basel II‘s failure, illustrating 
the devastating consequences of captured capital regulation, as well as his opinion that 
the Basel Committee has one of the worst records of all international standard-setters in 
terms of transparency, representation, and accountability, are also reiterated. 
 
Whilst the devastating impact of Basel II on pro cyclicality is a renowned flaw which is 
attributed to Basel II, some measures aimed at improving greater disclosure, transparency 
and accountability, particularly within Over-the-Counter derivatives markets, through 
standardization, are evidenced by recent efforts of the Financial Stability Board.
15
 
 
 
Title VII of the Dodd Frank Act, titled ―The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability 
Act of 2010‖ ―sets out a new framework for regulatory and supervisory oversight of the 
Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives market.‖ Within this Title, ―many swaps that are 
currently executed in the OTC market will be required to be cleared through derivatives 
clearing organizations.‖16  
 
SEC. 712. REVIEW OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY, subsections (a)(1) and (a) (2) 
provide as follows: 
 
(a) CONSULTATION.— 
(1) COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION.—Before commencing any rulemaking or 
issuing an order regarding swaps, swap dealers, major swap participants, swap data repositories, derivative 
clearing organizations with regard to swaps, persons associated with a swap dealer or major swap 
participant, eligible contract participants, or swap execution facilities pursuant to this subtitle, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall consult and coordinate to the extent possible with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the prudential regulators for the purposes of assuring regulatory 
consistency and comparability, to the extent possible. 
(2) SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.—Before commencing any rulemaking or issuing an 
order regarding security based swaps, security-based swap dealers, major security-based swap participants, 
security-based swap data repositories, clearing agencies with regard to security-based swaps, persons 
                                                                                                                                                 
capital regulation to maximize their profits at the expense of those without a seat at the decision-making 
table.‖ 
R Lall, ―Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III is doomed‖ Global Economic Governance 
Programme GEG Working Paper 2009/52 October 2009 at page 12 < 
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/GEG-Working-paper-Ranjit-Lall.pdf> 
15
 See Financial Stability Board, ―Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms‖ Oct 2010 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf 
16
 ―For example, exchanges or clearing houses, unless the organizations do not accept the swaps for 
clearing. Swaps not cleared through a clearing organization would be reported to the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC), the SEC, or a swap data repository. The Act imposes capital requirements on 
swap entities, which are swap dealers and major swap participants, as well as initial and variation margin 
requirements for uncleared swaps. Additionally, real time public data reporting of swap transactions is 
required under Title VII>‖ See KPMG, ―The Dodd Frank: Could There Be Accounting Consequences?‖ at 
page 5 of 8 http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/dodd-frank-
accounting-consequences.pdf 
associated with a security-based swap dealer or major security based swap participant, eligible contract 
participants with regard to security-based swaps, or security-based swap execution facilities pursuant to 
subtitle B, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall consult and coordinate to the extent possible with 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the prudential regulators for the purposes of assuring 
regulatory consistency and comparability, to the extent possible. 
 
 
Title VII‘s provisions are considered to signify a marked ―departure from current practice 
– though certain exemptions will be available, including an ―end user exemption‖ from 
clearing for a swap counterparty that is not a financial entity – that is, using the swap17 to 
hedge or mitigate commercial risk.‖18 
 
In relation to disclosure,
19
 Title IX, section 956 of the Dodd Frank Act ENHANCED 
COMPENSATION STRUCTURE REPORTING also provides as follows: 
 
(a) ENHANCED DISCLOSURE AND REPORTING OF COMPENSATION 
ARRANGEMENTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this title, the appropriate 
Federal regulators jointly shall prescribe regulations or guidelines to require each covered financial 
institution to disclose to the appropriate Federal regulator the structures of all incentive-based 
compensation arrangements offered by such covered financial institutions sufficient to determine whether 
the compensation structure— 
 
(A) provides an executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of the covered financial 
institution with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or 
(B) could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution. 
 
 
 
 
C. To What Extent does the Dodd Frank Act Impact Fair Value 
Measurements? 
 
A previous paper
20 has highlighted how accounting standards and Basel II contribute to  
                                                 
17
 ―Swap as defined in the Dodd Frank Act is considered to be very broad – encompassing derivatives other 
than swaps (such as options or many forward contracts) as well as many other types of agreements, 
contracts and transactions not previously considered derivatives.‖ See ibid  
18
 see ibid. 
19
 Also see SEC. 725. relating to DERIVATIVES CLEARING ORGANIZATIONS. 
 
‗‗(L) PUBLIC INFORMATION.— 
‗‗(i) IN GENERAL.—Each derivatives clearing organization shall provide to market participants sufficient 
information to enable the market participants to identify and evaluate accurately the risks and costs 
associated with using the services of the derivatives clearing organization. 
‗‗(ii) AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION.—Each derivatives clearing organization shall make 
information concerning the rules and operating and default procedures governing the clearing and 
settlement systems of the derivatives clearing organization available to market participants.‖ 
‗‗(iii) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.—relating to what information each derivatives clearing organization shall 
disclose publicly and to the Commission. 
20
 M Ojo, „The Role of the IASB and Auditing Standards in the Aftermath of the 2008/2009 
Financial  Crisis― European Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, September 2010, pp. 604–623 at page 612; Also 
procyclicality. Further, the pro cyclical nature of accounting, is attributed to two 
principal elements: 
 
Fair value measurements 
The treatment of impairments. 
 
Whilst results of a certain sample generated by Khan
21  illustrate and support the 
evidence that „a more fair value-oriented accounting regime is associated with an 
increase in bank contagion above and beyond that which exists as a result of trade 
and financial linkages in the banking industry―, Laux and Leuz argue in contrast (and 
based on their analysis), that fair value accounting (frequently also referred to as mark-
to-market accounting), is unlikely to have contributed to the severity of the 2008 
Financial Crisis in a major way.
22 Furthermore, they add that „while there may have 
been downward spirals or asset fire sales in certain markets, little evidence supports 
the fact that such effects are the result of fair value accounting.― 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Fair Value Measurements 
 
The principal advantage attributed to fair value measurements is namely, the value  
of information they incorporate in the financial statements – such value being more 
complete and accurate than that provided by historical cost accounting. 
 
 
Problems identified with fair value accounting, as highlighted by 
Ball, include:
23 
 
 
- Market liquidity is a potentially important issue in practice and spreads could be 
large enough to cause substantial uncertainty about fair values. In illiquid markets, 
trading by managers could influence traded – as well as quoted prices hence 
allowing them to manipulate fair value estimates. 
 
- The potential for fair value accounting to become „mark to model― accounting 
when liquid market prices are not available 
 
- Tendency for fair value accounting to increase opportunities for manipulation 
when „mark to model―  accounting is employed to simulate market prices (since 
                                                                                                                                                 
see M Grande, Accounting and Procyclicality, Conference on Financial Reporting in a Changing World at 
page 2 
21
 U Khan, „Does Fair Value Accounting Contribute to Systemic Risks in the Banking Industry?― at page 4 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327596> 
 
22
 See C Laux and C Leuz, „Did Fair Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis?― ECGI 
Working Paper Series  in  Finance,  Working  Paper  No  266  October  2009  at  page  3.  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1487905> 
23
 R Ball, „International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): Pros and Cons for Investors― at pages 21 
and 22 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929561> 
managers are able to influence both the choice of models and the parameter 
estimates). 
 
According to KPMG, one likely accounting related consequence of the requirements to 
clear swaps is attributed to measurements and disclosures of fair value under ASC Topic 
820, Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures. ―Fair value measurements‖, it is 
contended, ―take into account counterparty credit risk and collateral. To the extent 
clearing organizations become central counterparties to swap transactions (instead of the 
original counterparty) and/or collateral maintenance is required, fair value measurements 
of swaps will be different from what they would have been absent those characteristics.‖ 
The use of clearing organizations as central counterparties, in their opinion, may also 
―impact a company‘s eligibility to offset swaps in its balance sheet.‖24 
 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
Whilst recent initiatives promulgated by the Basel Committee, through the Basel III 
framework (initiatives aimed at mitigating pro cyclical effects), have been elaborated on 
under the introductory section of this paper, the implications of the Dodd Frank Act for 
fair value accounting continue to unravel. Further potential accounting implications 
attributed to the Dodd Frank Act, which have been identified by KPMG in their report, 
include:
25
 
 
- That attributed to Title IX requirements (titled Investor Protections and 
Improvements to the Regulation of Securities) under which section 941 requires 
any securitizer to retain an economic interest in a portion of the credit risk for any 
asset the securitizer transfers, sells or conveys to a third party through the 
issuance of asset backed securities.
26
 
- That attributed to Title VII requirements27 whereby the ―potential novation of 
existing derivatives may arise – either through a banking entity pushing out the 
swap or through submission of the swap to a clearing organization.‖28 
                                                 
24
 See KPMG, ―The Dodd Frank: Could There Be Accounting Consequences?‖ at page 5 of 8 
http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/dodd-frank-accounting-
consequences.pdf 
 
25
 See ibid at pages 1-2 
26
 ―Companies that normally sell loans and receivables through securitizations, including potential recourse 
factoring, will need to determine whether the risk retention provisions will apply to their current programs, 
including applicability of exemptions. If those provisions apply, then a company would be required to 
retain credit risk, raising the question of whether the financial assets transferred to the securitization should 
be derecognized. For financial institutions, if more assets are retained in a company‘s balance sheet, 
required capital levels will increase, thereby potentially decreasing the desirability of accessing 
securitization markets. The consolidation and de recognition requirements are complex and all forms of 
involvements through required risk retention would need to be assessed.‖ See ibid at page 2 
27
 The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 
28
 It is added that ―an assessment would need to be made as to whether the exchange of one counterparty to 
the swap for a different counterparty would result in swap being accounted for as the continuation of the 
existing swap or as an extinguishment of the existing swap combined with issuance of a new swap.‖ 
- That attributed to the Volcker Rule29 and Living Wills provisions30 
 
―Future efforts to revise capital adequacy standards must both observe basic standards of 
due process and ensure that information asymmetries are as small as possible – 
principally, but not exclusively, by maintaining some kind of distance between 
supervisory bodies and the banking industry. Though difficult in practice to achieve, if 
implemented faithfully, these changes would go a long way towards ensuring that the 
next time regulators set out to revise international capital standards, they achieve every 
one of their aims.‖31 
 
Further concerns attributed to the new Basel III framework relate to its ―facilitation of the 
shadow banking system whilst constraining the bank sector.‖32 The new, more stringent 
capital and liquidity requirements introduced through Basel III are likely to impact the 
more highly regulated banking sector since it is likely that there will be greater incentives 
to transact in less stringent regulated sectors such as the shadow banking system or 
through less stringent regulated capital instruments.
33
 
 
                                                 
29
 ―The statutory provisions that make up the Volcker Rule generally prohibit banking entities from 
engaging in two types of activities: 1) proprietary trading and 2) acquiring an ownership interest in, 
sponsoring, or having certain relationships with a hedge fund or private equity fund (each a covered fund). 
These statutory provisions apply, in general, to insured depository institutions; companies that control an 
insured depository institution; and foreign banks with a branch, agency, or subsidiary bank in the United 
States, as well as to an affiliate of one of these entities.  
 
The statutory definition of a fund covered under the Volcker Rule is quite broad. The statute also quite 
broadly prohibits any banking entity that serves as the investment manager, adviser, or sponsor to a covered 
fund, or that organizes and offers a covered fund, from engaging in certain transactions with the fund, 
including lending to, or purchasing assets from, the fund.  
 
One of the more difficult tasks in implementing the statutory prohibitions is distinguishing between 
prohibited proprietary trading activities and permissible market-making activities. This distinction is 
important because of the key role that market makers play in facilitating liquid markets in securities, 
derivatives, and other assets. The distinction between prohibited proprietary trading and permissible market 
making can be difficult to draw, because these activities share several important characteristics.‖ See D 
Tarullo, ―The Volcker Rule‖ Testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises and the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on 
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.  
January 18, 2012 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20120118a.htm 
 
30
 Whereby it is asserted that ―both the Volcker Rule and Living Will Provisions could lead to institutions 
selling parts of their businesses in order to comply with regulations. ― 
31
 See R Lall, ―Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III is doomed‖ Global Economic Governance 
Programme GEG Working Paper 2009/52 October 2009 at page 25 < 
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/GEG-Working-paper-Ranjit-Lall.pdf> 
32
 See BRIEF, „Deutsche Bank CFO Says Concerned New Basel Rules Allow Shadow Banking System 
Whilst Constraining Bank Sector― < http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2011-05/20264700-
briefdeutsche- bank-cfo-says-concerned-new-basel-rules-allow-shadow-banking-system-020.htm 
33
 See M Ojo, ―Financial Stability, New Macro Prudential Arrangements and Shadow Banking: Regulatory 
Arbitrage and Stringent Basel III Regulations‖ http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/31319/1/MPRA_paper_31319.pdf and 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1859543 
Given a consideration of the impacts of the Basel frameworks and that of the Dodd Frank 
Act on pro cyclicality and fair value measurements, even though initiatives are being 
undertaken to mitigate pro cyclical effects (as well as facilitate financial stability through 
increased transparency and disclosure), it has to be said that a more prominent role for 
international accounting standards would serve as a formidable means in mitigating 
discrepancies between accounting and regulatory policies, whilst ensuring that some kind 
of distance exists between supervisory bodies and the banking industry – such that an 
incidence of regulatory capture is avoided. 
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